The Aristotelian Model of Understanding of Cognitive Phenomena and his Medieval Reception
Abstract
Our purpose is to analyze some features of the Aristotelian model of the cognitive phenomena which can be considered as proper of an intentional concept of the mind: (i) a common or parallel structure to analyze sense perception and intellectual cognition; (ii) the categorization of the mental affairs under the notion of relatives or relation; (iii) the ambiguous characterization of cognition as a relation of identity or similarity between he who knows and what is known. When compared with the classical notion of intentionality as defined by Brentano, the Aristotelian model shows both similarities and differences. The medieval scholastic model seems to be, because of a variety of reasons, in a middle term between both.Downloads
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