La interpretación de Heidegger del devenir eterno en la filosofía de Schelling

Abstract

From Sein und Zeit (1927) onwards, Heidegger defines the “original temporality (ursprüngliche Zeitlichkeit)” as “temporality (Temporalität)” of the sense of the being in general. In this document we are going to uphold that the strategy followed by the author to develop such temporality consists of redefining the classic concept of “eternity (Ewigkeit)”, a concept that in classic philosophy is related to the absence of time and the cancellation thereof. To such purpose, we are going to show that in his course of the year 1936 related to the Schelling’s document titled Philosophischen Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände, which is dated 1809, Heidegger finds a concept of eternity that is defined and analyzed not as a supratemporal or permanently timeless present, but, on the contrary, it is revealed as the temporal origin of the world; the association between eternity and instant developed by Schelling to explain the appearance of evil in humanity is the criteria that Heidegger hermeneutically appropriates from the idealistic author to redefine, in this way, the classic concept of eternity, turning this latter into the temporal origin from which the entirety of time derives from. Therefore, in this writing we are going to reconstruct how the original temporal mobility of the eternal proposed by Schelling is going to be, in Heidegger’s opinion, the manner in which original temporality expresses, understood as temporality of the sense of the being in